Monday 12th May 2003 SAHARA ANALYSIS No. 21
The Moroccan state’s continued occupation of Western Sahara is often attributed to its need to play the nationalist card to maintain support for the monarchy and the military-business establishment. Many analyses gloss over whether this works. A number of recent events highlight the need to examine this more closely, and remind us that the Moroccan people are not as attached to the continued occupation of the Sahara as their rulers would like us to believe. May Day 2003 Dissolution of the
Sahara Section of the Forum for Truth & Justice postponed Moroccan Press Freedom
– Lmrabet on Hunger Strike Moroccan Democratic
Youth Abroad under fire from Secret Police What does all this add up to? Firstly, that there are plenty of Moroccans who have seen through the lies of their government about Western Sahara. They know that there is a Saharawi people; that the Saharawis want independence; and they are even willing to risk their own personal safety to meet with them. They may well perceive that they have a common enemy in the shadowy elite of the Moroccan establishment. Secondly, that the Moroccan state is absolutely determined to stamp on any such genuine cross-community “confidence building”. But all over Morocco and Western Sahara, and beyond, ordinary people are making person-to-person contacts which show Moroccans that they have nothing to fear from an independent Western Sahara.
James Baker recently presented the UN Security Council with the responses of the parties (POLISARIO Front, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria) to his latest proposals. Kofi Annan is due to present his next report to the Council on May 19th. Still officially secret, the proposals are rumoured to be a reworking of his controversial “Draft Framework Agreement” which sees an autonomous province of Western Sahara within Morocco as a basis for peace. The publication by Spanish newspaper “El Pais” of extracts from a recent book by a former UN diplomat has stirred up speculation about Baker’s role and the autonomy plan. In his recent memoirs “Peacemonger”, British former UN diplomat Marrack Goulding recalls being sent by Annan to persuade Baker to take the Western Sahara job to “ try to negotiate a deal based on enhanced autonomy for Western Sahara within the Kingdom of Morocco”. Shortly after taking the job in 1997, Mr Baker toured the region and met with Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. He declared that the referendum was still possible – and the Saharawis’ spirits soared. By 2000, the voter list was published. However, within a year, he had responded to Morocco’s attempt to lodge 130,000 appeals from rejected voters by putting forward the “Draft Framework Agreement”, which proposed integration of Western Sahara into Morocco as a province with “limited autonomy” and the holding of a referendum where Moroccan colonists would hold the majority. Mr Baker might say that he took the job prepared to look at any potential solution to the conflict in Western Sahara; that his declaration of faith in the Settlement Plan was genuine and made only after Morocco surprisingly said it was willing to proceed; and that the autonomy proposals only surfaced after later problems. Goulding, however, told El Pais that the autonomy plan had been in existence since Perez de Cuellar’s days as UN Secretary General in the early 1990s. This has prompted speculation that Baker and Annan were only pushing the Settlement Plan to extract concessions on autonomy from Morocco. Perez de Cuellar’s
complicity It is difficult to pluck the truth out of this tangled web of possibilities. But it seems that the truth now is that the autonomy plan is unworkable. Although it is rumoured to have increased the amount of autonomy that Western Sahara would have inside Morocco, it still advocates years of ”transition” under Moroccan rule with a referendum loaded with Moroccan colonists – which will likely lead to full integration into Morocco. It asks the Saharawi people to trust the Moroccan state to respect the terms of the transition and beyond. Understandably, they have no faith in the word of the Moroccan regime, and so they also have no faith in the autonomy plan. They feel only a true referendum of self-determination, implemented by a robust UN, can protect their safety and their rights. |
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